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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TRE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
CARL BALDWIN and LARRY GLEIM, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs end Appellants,) 
vs. Civil No. 18202 
VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the Appellants to rescind 
a contract for the purchase of seven (7) building lots from 
the Respondent and to seek restitution of moneys paid by Ap-
pellants to Respondent for the purchase of fcur (4) of the 
seven (7) building lots. Respondent counterclaimed to fore-
close Appellants' interest in the said four (4) building 
lots. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried in a District Court, sitting without 
a jury, on October 30, 1981. After the close of evidence, 
the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment against the Appellants and in favor of 
Respondent. 
A Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and the entry of a new or different Judgment was made 
1 
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by Appellants on November 25, 1981. The Court denjed said 
Motion on December 30, 1981. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm 
the lower Court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim, (hereinafter referred to 
as the Appellante), were business partners engaged general-
ly in the construction industry. (R.82). The Respondent 
Vantage Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as "Vantage"), 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Deseret Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, (hereinafter referred to as nDeseret 
Federal''). One of Vantage's business ventures was the de-
velopment of the "Blackhawk Subdivision" in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah. (R.184) . 
Sometime i.n April of 1978, the Appellants met with an 
employee of Vantage, Doug Boulton, at the offices of Deseret 
Federal in Orem. The Appellants were considering buying 
some building lots at Blackhawk Subdivision. At the first 
meeting, some of the terms and conditionn under which lots 
would be sold were discussed. (R.83). 
Later in April of 1978, the Appellants m€t two more 
times with Doug Boulton. These meetings took place at a 
Deseret Federal branch in Salt L2ke City. (R.86-88). At 
2 
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the last meeting, the Appellants gave Vantage a check for 
the· down payment on seven ( 7) lots at Blackhawk Subdivi-
sion. (R.88 and Plaintiff'~ Exhibit #1). Although there 
was testimony to the fact that an Earnest Money Agreement 
may have been entered into by the parties, nc evidence of 
tradition.al writings that are normally associated with the. 
sale of land was presented to the Court. (R.177). 
Despite the apparent lack of existence of a tradition-
al writing, most of the terms and conditions of the contract 
to sell the seven (7) lots tc the Appellants are not in dis-
pute. (Brief of Appellant, p.4). However, one item of the 
contract to sell the seven (7) lots is disputed. Appellants 
allege that Vantage unconditionally "guaranteed" to Appel-
lants that Deseret Federal would provide construction loans 
to Appellants for the building of homes on the seven (7) 
lots. (R.86-87). Vantage denies that such a condition 
exists. (R.79). The Trial Court held that the Appellants 
fail to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the 
existence of such a guarantee. (R.194-195). 
Shortly after the Appellants and Vantage entered intc 
the contract to purchase the seven (7) lots, the Appellants 
went to Alaska for su~~er. Upon their return in the fall, 
the Appellants noted that they had been receiving monthly 
billings for interest on the outstandi~g principal on the 
lots. (R.89). In January of 1979, Appellants gave a check 
to Vantage for all unpaid interest. (R.90 and Plaintiff's 
Exhibit //2) . 
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In June of 1979, the Appellants made another interest 
payment to Vantage. The payment was in the form of a check. 
Enclosed with the check was a handwritten letter that read: 
Bi.ACKHAWK ESTATES PLAT "D" 
Interest for Lots: 
18, 19, 28, 34, 35, 49, 58 
This check for $2,990.32 should 
pay us through May, 1979. 
Thank you, 
/s/ Carl B. Baldwin 
Baldwin & Gleim Construction 
(R.93, 174-175; Plaintiff's Exhibit /13, and Defendant's 
Exhibit 117). 
Sometiffie later in June of 1979, the Appellants sold two 
(2) of the lots to Mr. Mark Stringham and paid Vantage all 
the unpaid interest and principal attributed to those two 
(2) lots. Vantage passed titled for those lots to Mr. 
Stringham. Apparently the AppellBnts made a profit upon the 
sale of this property. (R.93-94, 116-117, and Defendant's 
Exhibit 115). 
In November of 1979, the Appellants sold one of the 
five (5) remaining lots to a Mr. O'Bannon. As with the 
other sale, the Appellants paid Vantage all unpaid principel 
and interest that was attributed to that lot and Vantage 
passed the title to Mr. O'Bannon. Again, the Appellants 
made a profit on the sale. (R.94, 117, and Defendant's 
Exhibit /15). 
In addition to the above-described three (3) lots sold 
by the Appellants, they also entered into an agreement to 
4 
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sell a lot to Mr. Gary Mayo, a former employee of Deserct 
Federal and neighbor to the Appellants. Mr. Mayo paid to 
the Appellants approximately the same amount of money that 
the Appellants had paid to Vantage in interest and princi-
pal. CR.112-113). 
Two years after entering their contract to purchase the 
seven (7) lots, the Appellants approached Ms. LaRae Pittman, 
a loan officer at Deseret Federal's Orem office, about ob-
taining construction financing to build two speculation 
homes on two of the lots. Ms. Pittman informed the 
Appellants that Deseret Federal was not making construction 
loans on speculation homes at that time. (R.96). The Ap-
pellants stated to the loan officer that Vantage had 
"guaranteed" construction financing from Deseret Federal. 
The Appellants werE then referred to Mr. Preben Nielsen, an 
officer of Vantage and Deseret Federal. (R.97-98). 
The Appellants and Mr. Nielsen had several meetings and 
conversations during the spring and summer of 1980. 
However, the parties could not arrive at a mutual agreement. 
(R.135-136). During this same period, the Appellants did 
make some unsuccessful effort to sell the remeining lots. 
(R.128). 
On December 8, 1980, the Appellants filed a Complaint 
seeking the return of approximately $9,000.00 from Vantage. 
On March 12, 1981, Vantage filed its Answer and Counterclaim 
seeking a foreclosure of Appellants' interest in the four 
(4) lots upon which there was still outstanding interest due 
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Vantage. On November 18, 1981, the Honorable Robert 
Bullock, one of the Judges of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah Ccunty, signed a Judgment dismissing 
1\ppellants' Complaint and granting a Decree of Foreclosure 
to Vantage. On January 11, 1982, Notice of Appeal was filed 
in this Court on behalf of the Appellants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. 
This cc..ee presents an uncommon use of the Statute of 
Frauds by the Appellants. Traditionally, the Statute of 
Frauds is used by a seller of real property as a defense 
against a buyer who seeks epecific performance of the agree-
ment to sell said real property. However, in this case, it 
is not the seller who is using the Statute of Frauds as a 
"shield", but the buyers who are using the Statute as a 
"sword". Although such use of the Statute of Frauds is not 
without legal precedence, it must be remembered that much 
case law that interprets the Statute of Frauds is addressing 
a different use of the Statute than is being proposed in 
this case. 
Appellants argue that the contract to purchase the 
seven (7) lots from Vantage is unenforceable by reason of 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Utah's Statute of Fraud, U.C.A. §25-5-3 (1953 as amended).* 
Because of this alleged unenforceability, Appellants claim 
that they are entitled to restitution of moneys paid to 
Vantage en four (4) of the seven (7) lots. However, the 
Trial Court held 1) that the Statute of Frauds was not ap-
plicable since there were sufficient writings and 2) that, 
even if the Statute was applicable, there was sufficient 
part performance to grant to the Court the equitab]e power 
to enforce the contra.ct. These two points will be dis-
cussed separately. 
A. Sufficient Memorandum 
Whether or not a writing is sufficient to satisfy 
the requirement of Utah's Statute of Frauds has been an 
issue that this Court has addressed on numerous occasions. 
An examination of this Court's opinion on this issue for the 
last several years clearly reve~ls the desire of this Court 
not to establish a bright-line test for determining whether 
or not a writing is sufficient to satisfy the Statute. 
In Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 242 P.2d 578 
(Utah, 1952), the Court reiterated the then traditional view 
that 11 the memorandum which is relied upon. to satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds must contain all the essential terms and 
*Appellants, in their Brief, refer to U.C.A. § 25-5-1 (1953 
as amended); however, since the subject matter of this case 
is a contract for the sele of land, §25-5-3 is more 
applicable. (Brief of Appellant, P.26). 
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provisions of the Contract". 242 P.2d at 580. However, 
this holding has be~n greatly modified. 
In Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467 (Utah, 1969), 
the Defendants had sent a letter to the Plaintiff "to con-
firm" the Plaintiff's 10% ownership in certain partner-
ship's assets which included real property. The Plaintiff 
later sued to receive his 10% and the Defendants raised the 
defense of the Statute of Frauds. This Court rejected the 
defense of the Statute of Frauds holding that the wording of 
U.C.A. §25-5-1 (1953 as amended) does not require that the 
writing contain all the requirements of a complete contract. 
Instead, the Court stated: 
All that is required is that the interest 
be granted or declared by a writing sub-
scribed by the party to be charged. 450 
P.2d at 469. 
In the recent case of Greg~rson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 
(Utah, 1980), the buyer sued the sellers for specific 
performance of a contract for the sale cf real property. 
The Trial Court refused to grant specific performance since 
there was not before it an adequate written description of 
the subject real property. Upon a motion for new trial, the 
buyer produced the newly discovered evidence of an unsigned 
deed which had the description of the property. The Trial 
Court refused to grant the new trial since the deed was un-
signed. This Court, in reversing the Trial Court's ruling, 
held that several writings may be construed together in 
order to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
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In order for several writings to be construed together, som€ 
"nexus between the writings must be shown". Further, parol 
evidence may be used to demonstrate the nexus. 617 P.2d at 
373. 
The standard, established by this Court for deter-
mining whether or not there exists sufficient writings to 
satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, dictate 
to a Trial Court: (1) that it must review all the written 
memorandum as a whole if eome nexus can be sho~m between the 
writings, (2) that it must find that the party who is being 
charged has signed, and (3) that it must find that the 
wording in the writings is of the quality necessary for the 
Trial Court to grant the relief requested. In applying this 
standard to the case at hand, the lower Court correctly held 
that the Statute of Frauds had been satisfied and, thus, was 
not applicable. The writings in thjs case consist of three 
(3) checks, a letter, and detailed ledgers. The wording on 
these memora.nda reveal signature~ of both Appellants, legal 
descriptions of the real property, the purchase price, the 
amount of the down payment, and the interest rate. The 
writings were of such sufficiency that the lower Court could 
not under the law have granted Appellants' requested relief, 
restitution. 
B. Part Performance. 
The Doctrine of Part Performance has been used by 
courts of equity as a means to take a contract outside the 
9 
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traditionally hard-and-fast rules of the Statute of Frauds. 
This doctrine has partially been codified in Utah as U.C.A. 
§ 25-5-8 (1953 as amended). Although the lower Court in 
this matter found sufficient writings to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Statute of Frauds, it also found 
sufficient part performance by the parties to take the con-
tract outside the scope of the Statute. 
The Appellants in their Brief advanced the follow-
ing rationale as to why the Lower Court errored in its ap-
plications of the Doctrine of Part Performance: 
1) There were seven (7) separate contracts between the 
parties; each contract was to purchase one lot; 
2) Therefore, performance by Vantage on three (3) of 
the seven (7) contracts is not part performance on the part 
of Vantage as to the remaining four (4) contrects; and, 
3) Finally, Vantage ca.nnot rely upon the payments made 
by the Appellante a.s part performance. 
However, this reasoning misinterprets the facts in this case 
and the law of part performance. 
First, Appellants have misapplied the facts by ar~ 
guing in their brief that there was only one ccntract. 
(Brief of Appellants, P.29). As counsel for the Appellants 
said during the trial, whether the parties in this case 
entered into one contract covering seven (7) lots or seven 
(7) contracts each covering one lot is an issue of fact to 
be decided by the Court. (R.93). The lower Court 
implicitly found there to be only one contract and there is 
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substantial evidence of record to support such a findinE. 
The agreement to buy the seven (7) lots was done at the same 
time. Payments on the seven (7) lots were done with one 
check. With the exception of the purchase price, all the 
terms and conditions of sale, (both agreed and disputed 
terms), were the same. Finally, the Appellants themselves 
thought of the transaction as one contract. Appellant Carl 
Baldwin testified at trial as to his meeting with Doug 
Boulton as follows: 
... After formally being introduced to Doug, we got 
down to business and talked about some lots that 
were being sold only to contractors. We then went 
into discussion about what lots were avail-
able, the terms of a contract agreement. (F.83). 
Thus, there is substantial evidence on the record to support 
the finding that the parties had entered into one contact 
for the purchase of seven (7) lots. 
Seconci, the lower Court properly a.pp lied the laws of 
the Doctrine of Part Performance to the facts in this ca.se. 
As was mentioned above, it is usually the buyer of the real 
property who invokes the Doctrine of Part Performar.ce. In 
those situations, the buyer is arguing that his actions were 
of such character that it would violate the princjples of 
equity not to enforce the contract. In a situation in which 
e seller seeks to invoke the Doctrine of Part Performance, 
the Courts must be careful not to place the seller in the 
position of neither being able to enforce the contract by 
reason of the Statute of Frauds, nor deny the contract by 
reason of the Doctrine of Part Performance. Thus, if the 
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Doctrine would be available to buyer, it must also be 
available to the seller! 
This spirit of flexibility and fairness was announced 
by this Court in Holmgrin Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534 
P.2d 611 (Utah, 1975), in which Chief Justice Maughan wrote: 
The Doctrine of Part Performance, in the State of 
Utah, has not been reduced to a formula, as it has 
in some of our sister states. Thus, decisions of 
this Court do not stay the hand of equity in the 
·equitable situations created by oral contracts for 
the transfer of ~n interest in land, but the 
statute is preserved and remains to serve its 
purpose - the prevention of fraud and injustice. 
534 P.2d at 613-614. 
The Trial Court in this case was faced with the fol-
lowing facts: (1) Both parties admit to the existence of a 
contract to buy seven (7) lots; (2) The buyers paid a_10% 
down payment on the seven (7) lots; (3) The buyers made 
several interest payments on the lots; (4) The buyers sold 
four of the lots and paid seller in full for three of the 
lots; (5) Having been paid in full for three of the lots, 
the seller·transferred its complete interest in those lots; 
(6) The buyers made a profit in reselling three of the lots; 
(7) The buyers attempted to sell the three remaining unsold 
lots; and, (8) The contract between the parties was two and 
a half years old before the buyers attempted to rescind it. 
It is clear from these facts tha.t it would have been unjust 
and tanarnount to fraud to invoke the Statute of Frauds in 
this matter when both parties, over a substantial period of 
time, relied upon and acted in accordance with their 
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this matter when both parties, over a substantial period of 
time, relied upon and acted in accordance with their 
contractual relationship. See Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 
1035 (Utah, 1975). 
Finally, Appellants argue that the mere payment of 
money by a buyer is not sufficient to remove a contract for 
the sale of real property from the Statute of Frauds. The 
Appellants are correctly stating this traditional rule. 
Maxfield v. West, 23 P.754 (Utah, 1980). See also 9 Utah 
Law Review 91 (1964). However, this traditional standard 
has little application to the facts in this case. As stated 
above, th~re was only one contract and Vantage did more than 
just accept Appellants' money. Also, the Appellants 
exercised dominion over the four (4) lots upon which they 
are suing by selling one of lots and by trying to sell the 
other three. Thus, there was more than a "mere payment of 
money". 
The Trial Court correctly rejected Appellants' use of 
the Statute of Frauds as a "sword" in this case. The Court 
recognized that there were sufficient writings to derron-
s tr ate unequivocBbly that there existed a contract to sell 
seven (7) lots. The Court also recognized that both parties 
had acted in such a manner that the Doctrine of Part Perfor-
mance would preclude either party from invoking the Statute 
of Frauds. The Appellants' use of the Statute of Frauds 
should also be rejected by this Court since such a use is 
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inconsistent with the principles of equity, and it is based 
upon a misapplication of the facts in this case. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT VANTAGE 
DID NOT "GUARANTEE" CONSTRUCTION FINANCING. 
The Appellants allege that one of the conditionf of the 
contract to sell the seven lots was that Vantage uncon-
-· 
ditionally "guaranteed" that Deseret Federal would provide 
construction financing to the Appellants when they decided 
to build houses en those lots. The Appellants further 
allege that, since Deseret Federal did not provide construe-
tion financing, they are entitled to restitution of moneys 
paid on four of the seven lots. 
However, the Trial Court, upon hearing all the testi-
mony and reviewing all the evidence found that the 
Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that Vantage had made such a "guarantee". Thus, the 
Trial Court rejects, as a matter of law, the four (4) legal 
theories advanced by Appellants, e.g. breach of contract, 
unjust enrichment, misrepresentation and fraud, and upon 
which they claim they are entitled to restitution. 
Although the Appellants discuss in their brief why the 
legal theories they advanced at trial entitled them to 
restitution, the thrust of their argument on appeal is that 
the Trial Court erred when it entered its Findings of Fact 
N o. 11: 
Plaintiffs contended that an officer of Vantage 
Corporation had repre~ented to them at the time of 
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purchase that at any time in the future they would 
be guaranteed construction loan money to build on 
any of the lots. Plaintiffs did not sustain their 
burden of proof that any such guarantee was made 
to them and it further appears the most con-
vincing evidence is that no employee of Vantage 
Corporation or its parent, Deseret Federal Savi~gs 
and Loan· Association, had authority to bind the 
Association to make a future loan. 
Appellants advance two (2) main reasons for why said 
finding is improper: 1) Vantage admitted to existence of 
the "guarantee" in its Answer; and 2) the Trial Court im-
properly ignored the testimony of the Appellants. These two 
points, plus a review of the evidence present at triBl, will 
be discussed below separately. 
A. Vantage's Answer. 
Appellants maintain that, because Vantage admitted to 
the existence of the guarantee in its Answer, the Trial 
Court erred when it found that the guarantee had not been 
made. However, when the admission in the Answer is viewed 
in light of how the case developed, the Trial Court was 
within its discretion as to whether or not to hold such an 
admission as conclusive. 
Mr. Garrett, at trial, inforrred the Court that any ad-
mission to the guarantee was an error on his part since the 
existence cf the guarantee was always at issue. (R.210). 
Mr. Harding, counsel for the Appellants, certainly ·knew well 
in advance cf trial that the existence of the guarantee was 
disputed. The first action taken by the parties in this 
matter after the pleadings had been filed was the Pre-Trial 
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hearing held on May 22, 1981, before Judge Bullock. At that 
Pre-Trial, Joseph E. Hatch, counsel for Vantage, stated to 
the Court that, "We allege that they made no promise to make 
construction loans." (R.215). Mr. Harding later seemed to 
recognize the disputed nature of this issue when he stated, 
"It will be a factual issue, I guess, really." (R.215). 
Just prior to trial, the Appellants sent Interroga-
tories tp Vantage. Interrogatory No. 6 read: 
Did the Defendant or any of its officers or em-
ployees during discussion upon which the oral 
contract is based or at anv other time state that 
it would guarantee construction loans on said lots 
for the Plaintiffs with Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan? 
Vantage's Answer to In,terrogatory No. 6 was "No". (R. 24). 
Further,. Mr. Garrett in his opening statement at the trial 
stated, "The evidence, your Honor, as to guarantee is going 
to be sharply disputed." (R.79). Thus, there was no 
question that the Appellants knew in advance cf trial and 
throughout the litigation that Vantage did not "admit" to 
the existence of the guarantee. The record in this matter 
reveals the extensive amount of time that was spent on the 
issue of the guarantee by both parties. It is apparent that 
the Appellants did not rely on the "admission" in the 
Answer. 
Finally, paragraph 2 of the Fourth Cause of Action of 
Appellants' Amended Complaint reads: 
That immediately prior to said sale Defendant 
represented to the Pld.ntiffs that it would 
guarantee construction loans with Deseret Federal 
Savings 2.nd Loan Association. 
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Vantage denied this paragraph in its Answer and it, of 
course, goes to the same facts. Thus, the tenor of the 
Answer was to deny the existence of the guarantee. 
However, the Appellants argue that the "admission" is 
conclusive and final. This simply is not the law. Such an 
admission is a judicial admission. It is not necessarily an 
evidenciary admission. Thus, the trier of fact has the dis-
cretion to pla.ce as much weight as he feels is appropriate. 
See Heth v. Del Webb's Hi.ghwav Inn, 429 P.2d 442 (Ariz., 
1967). 
In determining how much weight should be plci.ced upon 
such an admission, the Trial Court could certainly take into 
account the fact that Vantage denied the existence at every 
opportunity subsequent to the filing of the Answer and that 
the Appellants never raised the fact of the admission in the 
pleading until closing arguments. Thus, the Trial Court was 
within its discretion in holding such an admission was not 
conclusive as to the issue of the existence of the 
guarantee. 
B. Testimony of Appellants. 
Appellants also argue that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion when it found that the "guarantee" was not made 
because such a finding contradicts the direct testimony of 
the two Appellants. However, this was not an abuse of the 
Trial Court's discretion. 
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In DeVas v. Noble, 369 P.2d 290 (Utah, 1962), the Court 
affirmed the Trial Court's ruling in favor of the Defendant 
despite the uncontradicted direct testimony of the Plain-
tiff. In affirming the Lower Court, Justice Crockett wrote: 
Due to his function as the determiner of the facts 
and his advantaged position in close proximity to 
the witnesses and the trial, it is his privilege 
to be the exclusive judge of the credibility of 
the witnesses, the weight to be given the evidence 
and the facts to be found therefrom. This 
includes appraisal of the ability of the witnesses 
to know and understand and their capc_city to re-
member. The court's prerogative of course does 
not go so far as to permit him to stubbornly 
ignore and refuse to be guided by credible, un-
contradicted evidence when all reasonable minds 
would accept it. That could result in arbitrary 
and unreasoning denial or distortion of justice. 
Nevertheless because of the prerogative just 
mentioned as judge of all aspects of the case, if 
the testimony of a witness is affected with any 
frailty which might reasonably be considered as 
casting suspicion upon it or discrediting its 
accuracy or truthfulness, the court is not bound 
to accept such testimony as the fact and so find. 
And the rule is not otherwise because the witness 
happened to be a party to the action. 369 P.2d at 
293. 
Th~ above position was reaffirmed by this Court in Anderson 
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 583 P.2d 101 (Utah, 
1978), when it stated: 
The testimony of a party or other interested 
witness is not conclusive, even if it is not 
contradicted, as here. His testimony is to be 
given such weight and credibility as the trier of 
fact finds reasonable under the circumstances. 
583 P.2d at 104. 
The Appellants argument in this regard relies heavily 
upon the case of McClellan v. David, 439 P.2d 673 (Nev., 
1968). However, that case involves some extremely unusual 
facts. A Nevada trial Court set aside a default judgment in 
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favor of Plaintiff. The Plaintiff appealed alleging that 
the lower Court had abused its discretion in setting aside 
the judgment. The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed, holding 
that the only reason the lower Court could set aside the 
judgment is if it disregarded the testimony of a Mrs. 
Troxel, an interested witness. Not only is this case 
controversial, as the excellent descenting opinion points 
out, but :Lt is dea.1 ing with such a. completely different set 
of circumstances that it is of little value. 
The Trial Court, as the trier of fact, was within its 
discretion when it entered a finding that was contrary to 
the testimony of two interest witnesses. Thus, this Court 
should affirm that finding. 
C. The Evidence Supporting the Lower Court's Finding. 
The Appellants seem to be arguing that as a matter of 
law they are entitled to restitution since the Appellants 
testified that the "guarantee" was made by Mr. Boulton, 
Vantage admitted inadvertently in its Answer that guarantee 
existed, and Mr. Boulton could not remember his conversa-
tion with the Appellants. However, such an argument ignores 
the large amount of evidence that indicates that no "guaran-
tee" was made. 
First, it was almost two years a.fter the parties had 
entered into the contract when the Appellants first 
approached Deseret Federal about obtaining construction f i-
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nancing on any of the lots. Also, during that two year 
period, the Appellants sold four of the seven lots. Three 
of those lots were sold at a profit to the Appellants. This 
is certainly evidence of the fact that the "guarantee" did 
not exist. Also, it is evidence that the Appellants' 
dealings in this matter is inconsistent with the "existence" 
of a guarantee. Such behavior is a waiver by the Appellants 
of the "guarantee" even if it existed. See Larsen v. 
Knight, 233 P.2d 365 (Utah, 1951), and Hoke v. 
Stevens-Norton, Inc., 375 P.2d 743 (Wash., 1962). 
Second, Mr. Boulton testified that although he could 
not clearly remember his conversations with the Appellants, 
it would be contrary to his training and experience to make 
such a guarantee. (R.159). This is evidence to support the 
Trial Court's finding that the guarantee was not made. 
Third, Mr. Preben Nielsen, the Executive Vice President 
and Manager of Vantage, testified that Vantage had no 
authority to bind Deseret Federal to make loans, that no one 
at Deseret Federal had authority to commit Deseret Federal 
to make construction loans in the future, and the Doug 
Boulton did not have the authority to commit Deseret Federal 
to make loans in the future. (R.189-190). The lack of au-
thority to make such a ' 1guarantee" is certainly evidence 
that the Trial Court can consider in finding that no such 
guarantee was made. 
Thus, the Trial Court did not arbitrarily disregard the 
testimony of the Appellants. There is substantici_l evidence. 
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to support a Court's finding that no guarantee was made; and 
there is considerable reasons to support the Court's con-
clusion that Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof 
by the preponderance of the evidence. 
Finally, the Appellants argue that this Court has the 
duty to review and to weight all the evidence in this case. 
However, the two cases cited by the Appellants in support of 
this view demonstrate that this Court does not have total 
discretion in reviewing the facts. In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 
495 P.2d 811 (Utah, 1972), this Ccu/rt held: 
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this action 
to avoid deeds is one in equity upon which this 
court has both the prerogative and the duty to 
review and weight the evidence, and to determine 
the facts. However, in the practical application 
of that rule it is well established in our deci-
sional law that due to the advantaged position of 
the trial court, in close proximity to the parties 
and the witnesses, there is indulged a presumption 
of correctness of his findings and judgment, with 
the burden upon the appellant to show they were in 
error; and where the evidence is in conflict, we 
do not upset his findings merely because we have 
reviewed the matter differently, but do so only if 
evidence clearly preponderates against them. 495 
P.2d at 812.. 
In the case of Hatch v. Bastian, 567 P.2d 1100 (Utah, 
1977), the Plaintiff brought an action for either rescis-
sion or reformation of a deed because of an alleged mutual 
mistake of the parties. Judge Bullock ruled in favor of the 
Defendant because he found the evidence did not support the 
fact that there had been a mutual mistake. This Court af-
firmec Judge Bullock's decision and held as follows: 
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Even though we may review the evidence, the pro-
position is well grounded in our law that due to 
the advantaged position of the trial court, we 
indulge considerable deference to his findings and 
do not interfere with them unless the evidence so 
clearly preponderates against them that this court 
is convinced that a manifest iniustice has been 
done.· On the basis of what has.been said above 
concerning the dispute i.n the evidence and the 
burdens of proof, we are not persuaded that the 
findings and judgment should be overturned. 567 
P.2d at 1102. 
As has been discussed above, the Appellants have failed to 
meet their burden on appeal and show that the Trial Court 
erred in finding that Vantage had not made the alleged 
guarantee. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons stated above, .Respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm the trial Court's judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of May, 1982. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
By ~~~ ~L Hi~ Jo~eph .. Hatch 
Attorney for Respondent 
311 South State Street 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage 
prepaid, this 4th day of May, 1982 to Ray M. Harding, Jr., 
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Esq., HARDING AND HARDING, Attorney for Appellants, 58 South 
Hain Street, P. 0. Box 532, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062. 
( •, ,1 1 ' d ~u .tic) 
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